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We found these commentaries to be deeply thought- 
ful and thought-provoking. Not only were we led down 
new paths, but we were also led to reexplore the old 
ones. In addition, it was gratifying to see that many of 
the most common questions were ones that we have 
addressed in our latest research. Thus we are able to 
present new data that speak to a number of issues, 
including stereotyping, cross-culturd differences, and 
the origins of implicit theories in early childhood. We 
begin with issues relating to the mode1 and its con- 
structs, and then we go on to consider generalization of 
the model to new areas. 
The Model and Its Csnstmcks 
Goals and Motivation 
The original model proposed by Dweck and Elliott 
(1983) and Dweck and Leggett (1988) is a motivational 
model with goals as central constmcts. In this model, 
the two implicit theories create an emphasis on differ- 
ent goals, and the goals, in the context of the theories, 
then set up different cognitive, affective, and bebav- 
iord responses (Dweck, 1998). 
Hwackiewicz and Elliot (who are doing their own 
very interesting work on achievement goals) ask 
whether we still adhere to this fornulation. In a related 
manner, Peterson admonishes us not to strip away 
feelings and motives, and Weiner calls for a network of 
constructs to which implicit theories are linked. Indeed, 
we remain very much committed to our motivational 
model. Our work repeatediy demonstrates that holding 
an entity theory of intelligence orients individuals to- 
wardpetfiirmance goals (and a vulnerability to helpjess 
attribntions and reactions) relative to an incremental 
theory, which orients them more towasd learning goals 
(and a mastery-oriented response; see, e.g., Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988). We continue to obtain clear support for 
these relations, For example. as part of a study with 
college students just conducted by Claudia Mueller and 
Carol Dweck, we included four items that pitted ;a 
preference for learning gods against a preference for 
performance goals. Students who held a fixed theory of 
their intelligence differed strongly and significantly 
from students who held a malleable theory on every one 
of the goal items. 
Specifically, those with the entity theory agreed sig- 
nificantly more with the statements '7f H knew I wasn't 
going to do well at a task, I probably wouldn't do it even 
if P might learn a lot from it" and 'Xlthough I hate to 
admit it, P sometimes would rather do well in a class 
than learn a 1st.'' In contrast, those with the incremental 
theory agreed significantly more with ""It's much more 
important for me to lean things in my classes than it is 
to get the best grades." The fourth statement had a 
slightly different format. It read "If 1 Had to choose 
between getting a good grade and being challenged in 
class, I would choose . . ." Students then circled either 
"good grade" or '-being challenged." Most of the entity 
theorists (65%) chose the good grade option, whereas 
only 32% of the incremental theorists sdected this 
option, with the majority opting for being challenged. 
So, as in our earlier work, the theories of intelligence 
that students held predicted their emphasis on learning 
versus performance goals, with one group being more 
oriented towad leaning new things and being chal- 
lenged and the other toward getting grades and per- 
forming well, even at the sacrifice of learning. 
We also remain very much convinced that emotions 
play a large and critical role ila the motivational pro- 
cesses set in motion by the two theories. In the target 
article, however, we did not construct the model around 
goals and we did not emphasize the roles of motivation 
and emofion. This is because om recent work on social 
judgment, unlike our work in the achievement area, has 
nos yet focused extensively on people's goals (e.g., in 
impressions B'ormation) or on the role of their emotions 
in the way they react to other people. We thus chose to 
concentrate in this d i c l e  on the more cognitive aspects 
of the model-the ways in which implicit theories may 
cognitively orient individuals toward different ways of 
understanding their experiences and the ways in which 
these different interpretations of experience can guide 
different reactisass. 
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An important step, however, is to fill in the motiva- 
tional and emotional aspects of the model for the do- 
mains of social perception and social interaction. Carol 
Dweck (in press) embarked on this task (see also 
Dweck & Leggett, 1988). In Dweck (in press), a model 
of the social domain is constructed around implicit 
theories and goals. This model is entirely analogous to 
the model in the intellectual achievement domain, with 
the entity theory orienting individuals more toward 
judgment goals (the general class of goals that includes 
performance goals) and the incremental theory orient- 
ing individuals more toward development goals (the 
general class of goals that includes learning goals). 
With judgment goals, the aim of the individual is to 
render a judgment of the attribute in question, whereas 
with development goals, the aim is to develop the 
attribute in question as well as to understand its dynam- 
ics. In the model, the theories and goals in concert then 
set up different reactions. The findings from our recent 
research (e.g., Chiu, Sacks, & Dweck, 1994; Hong, 
1994; Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 1994) are used to illustr- 
ate and support the model. 
In summary, we remain strongly committed to a 
motivational model in which goals and emotions play 
critical roles, although the more cognitive aspects of 
our model were highlighted in the target article. Indeed, 
we believe that the full model has the kind of network 
of variables called for by Weiner in his commentary. 
Causal Relations Among Variables in 
the Model 
An important question, raised by Lewis, Peterson, 
and Sorrentino, relates to what actually causes what in 
the model. The model is set up to suggest that the two 
implicit theories foster different goals, interpretations 
of events, and reactions to events. Support for this view 
comes from studies in which we have manipulated 
implicit theories and have shown that this alters 
participants' goals and reactions. These findings sug- 
gest that implicit theories can serve as the cause of the 
other variables in the model. However, the variables in 
the model represent a network of interrelated structures, 
and it is indeed possible that by eliciting any one of the 
major variables, one also elicits others of its partners in 
the framework. Thus it is conceivable that by setting up 
situations that strongly promote certain goals or attri- 
butions, one may also make a certain implicit theory 
more salient to the individual. This is consistent with 
the view that when a knowledge structure is activated, 
related ones also become more accessible. 
It is also possible that, developmentally, the vari- 
ables arise in a different order than that represented in 
the model (see the Lewis commentary). For example, 
it could be that a concern with judgment and a tendency 
to react to negative outcomes in a helpless manner 
develop before children formulate theories about the 
fixedness or malleability of self-attributes. In this view, 
the implicit theory the child developed would grow up 
around the existing goals and patterns. This implicit 
theory would then join the network of variables, per- 
haps now driving the system, solidifying the concerns, 
making certain outcomes more meaningful, and mak- 
ing the goals and patterns more likely. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the belief in a fixed 
or malleable self arises in conjunction with the con- 
cerns, goals, and patterns of reaction that characterize 
a given system in our model. For example, it is possible 
that the experiences that foster a concern with perfor- 
mance and judgment versus learning and development 
are ones that also promote the view of one's attributes 
as fixed versus malleable. We have a new study that 
speaks to this issue, and we describe it in the section on 
how the implicit theories might arise. 
Can People Hold Both Theories? 
Several commentators (Anderson, Darley, Harackie- 
wicz and Elliot, Lewis, and Schunk) posed this ques- 
tion. For simplicity's sake, we have tended to portray 
the two implicit theories as mutually exclusive alterna- 
tives, and in our measures, we have asked participants 
to choose between the two. Indeed, logically speaking, 
they are mutually exclusive alternatives. Believing that 
something cannot be changed is the logical opposite of 
believing it can be changed. Nonetheless, students of 
the human mind know that the fact that two beliefs are 
opposites does not prevent people from holding them 
both (see Darley commentary). People do not tend to 
comb through their system of beliefs, spotting and 
eliminating contradictions and inconsistencies. Thus, 
along with our commentators, we think that it is per- 
fectly possible for an individual to hold both theories. 
We agree that although one theory may be the more 
dominant and have stronger links to its allied structures 
in the model, the other may still be available and may 
become accessible under particular circumstances (see 
the Anderson, Harackiewicz and Elliot, Kruglanski, 
and Schunk commentaries). The fact that we have been 
quite successful in manipulating people's implicit the- 
ories (and, by doing so, eliciting other aspects of the 
model) suggests that perhaps both theories are familiar 
to many people. This possibility-that many people 
actually hold both theories, albeit to differing de- 
grees-raises many other intriguing possibilities and 
suggests that research into the circumstances that might 
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elicit the different theories may well be in a fruitful 
direction. 
Implicit Theories as Knowledge 
Structures 
Several of the commentators (Anderson, Darley, 
Harackiewicz and Elliot, Kruglanski, and Lewis) sug- 
gested, in one form or another, the view of the implicit 
theories and their allied constructs (e.g., goals, attribu- 
tions) as knowledge structures. We not only find this 
view to be congenial, we also find it to be extremely 
productive in that it helps capture a number of phenom- 
ena. For example, the knowledge structure approach 
allows us to understand more easily how an individual 
can hold both theories but to differing degrees. It cap- 
tures the way in which each theory has links to other 
knowledge structures (such as goals and attributions), 
with the strongest links generally being to the other 
structures that we have depicted as within the same 
framework in our model (see Anderson commentary). 
For example, an entity theory would have stronger links 
to performance goals and internal, global, stable attri- 
butions than would an incremental theory. Even more 
interesting, the knowledge structure approach can cap- 
ture the fact, cogently discussed by Darley and by 
Kruglanski, that the implicit theories can be relatively 
stable and relatively malleable. If an individual holds 
both theories as knowledge structures of differing 
strength, then this system can be fairly stable when left 
to itself. However, with direct intervention from the 
outside, the weaker theory can gain strength or acces- 
sibility and thus be more readily elicited in the future. 
Also, as noted by Anderson, the knowledge structure 
approach lends itself to representing the domain speci- 
ficity of the theories. 
Finally, this approach may also help us understand 
when the theories might not have their predicted con- 
sequences. We believe that much of the impact of the 
theories is through their allied structures. For example, 
much of the impact of the entity theory of intelligence 
comes from its links to performance goals and helpless 
attributions (i.e., to self-judgment and self-blame). We 
believe that the entity theory fosters these links, but we 
do not believe that this linkage is a logical necessity. 
Thus, if in agiven individual, the entity theory were not 
strongly linked with these other structures, it would not 
have the same impact. For example, an individual 
might believe that his or her intelligence is fixed but 
that effort and learning are nonetheless of supreme 
importance. Such an individual might think and act 
much like an incremental theorist. 
In summary, we agree with our commentators that 
thinking of implicit theories and their allied con- 
structs as knowledge structures can be illuminating and 
productive. 
When Is It Better to Be an Entity 
Theorist? 
Several commentators (Anderson, Harackiewicz 
and Elliot, Peterson, Sorrentino, and Weiner) note that 
we have discussed many advantages of the incremental 
theory but have discussed few for the entity theory. 
After all, such a widely held view must have something 
more than parsimony going for it or why would it be so 
widely held? We subscribe wholeheartedly to the idea 
that all views have their costs and benefits (Higgins, 
1991). Although we have thus far tended to find fewer 
costs for the incremental view and fewer benefits for 
the entity view, let us examine this issue further. 
Let us begin with the issue of when an incremental 
theory might serve someone poorly. This might occur 
when people cannot come to terms with personal limi- 
tations, either their own or those of others. That is, 
believing in malleability of personal attributes, people 
might persist in a course of action for which they are 
unsuited (see Peterson commentary). For example, they 
may train to be concert pianists or basketball stars, 
despite the fact that their current degree of ability and 
theirrate of progress make success unlikely. In arelated 
vein, believing in the potential for growth and change, 
some incremental theorists may overestimate the like- 
lihood of personal change in others, as the possibility 
of change and the probability of change are two sepa- 
rate things. This can pose problems when such people 
invest heavily in dysfunctional relationships (e.g., with 
parents, romantic partners, or friends) under the as- 
sumption that the individual in question will soon actu- 
alize their potential for change. To summarize this 
point, an incremental theory can sometimes become a 
liability if the incremental theorist does not come to 
terms with limitations in the extent of possible growth 
or in the likelihood of growth. 
Let us now assess the potential benefits of the entity 
theory. One question raised by Elliot and Harackiewicz 
and by Weiner is: Shouldn't it be advantageous to 
believe in fixed traits when you think that yours are 
fixed and wonderful? Or as an extremely bright student 
of Carol Dweck's, perhaps referring to himself, once 
asked: "Wouldn't it be good to be an entity theorist if 
you were really a genius?'Continuing with the case of 
intelligence, our answer is: Yes, if you could really be 
sure. However, the entity theory system does not seem 
to be a system that breeds security. First, with intelli- 
gence (or most personal attributes, for that matter), one 
is dealing with an invention, a construct that cannot be 
measured with any certainty. One has to keep looking 
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at reflections of it in performance to reassure oneself of 
its adequacy. So, although entity theorists believe their 
intelligence is fixed, they can never really know for 
certain at what level it is fixed, and their estimates of 
this fixed trait may vary considerably over time de- 
pending on the outcomes they are experiencing. In 
other words, self-judgments of presumably fixed traits 
can be highly unstable. 
Second, as we suggested earlier, there are other 
correlated beliefs within the entity theory framework 
that appear to make confidence somewhat fragile. 
These are the beliefs not only that failure implies low 
ability (Hong & Dweck, 1992), but also that the need 
for effort, in and of itself, implies low ability (see 
Dweck & Leggett, 1988). To illustrate the latter, Clau- 
dia Mueller and Carol Dweck have just completed a 
study in which they asked college students with entity 
and incremental theories of intelligence a number of 
questions about their goals and beliefs. We found that 
entity theorists were far more likely than incremental 
theorists to agree with statements like "If you're really 
good at something, you shouldn't have to work very 
hard to do well in that area" or "I sometimes feel that 
the more effort you have to put into your school assign- 
ments, the less intelligent you probably are." Students 
with the incremental theory squarely disagreed with 
these assertions. This means that for many entity theo- 
rists, challenges and obstacles, which require effort, can 
automatically call their intellect into question. Thus, 
even if an entity theorist is basking in the glow of past 
successes, the presence of failure, and even the need for 
effort, can cause that glow to dissipate. 
Yet, if someone truly believed that he or she were 
extremely intelligent and did not call this into question 
or feel the need to prove it on a regular basis, then this 
would seem to be an ideal state-and it is typically 
called unconditional positive self-regard or a sense of 
unconditional worth. However, we believe that this 
desirable state actually exists more often among incre- 
mental theorists (see Burhans & Dweck, in press). In 
our work with young children, we are addressing this 
question directly. As we describe later, we have found 
that a procedure that promotes conditional positive 
regard also promotes the belief in fixed traits. 
This is not to say that an entity theory cannot poten- 
tially fuel great achievement. Although much of our 
work documents the way in which the fixed theory can 
promote vulnerability to helplessness, it is also possible 
that the need to prove one's ability (and, perhaps, one's 
worth) can lead to tremendous efforts. That is, if entity 
theorists can escape the belief that high effort implies 
low ability, then they may attempt to validate their 
ability through great accomplishment. This mode of 
achievement may have amore driven quality in contrast 
to the more learning-oriented, possibly more intrinsi- 
cally motivated achievements of those with an incre- 
mental theory, but it can nonetheless yield considerable 
attainments. 
In summary, the entity theory may often lead indi- 
viduals to shy away from effort and challenge, to ques- 
tion their intelligence in the face of difficulty, and to 
focus on validating and protecting their sense of ability 
at the sacrifice of learning. However, we agree that an 
entity theory of intelligence can sometimes be a spur to 
achievement, if individuals are either certain of their 
high ability or are led to prove their ability through 
high-effort accomplishments. 
Turning to implicit theories of others, we showed in 
the target article how entity theorists tend to make 
rapid, often global evaluative judgments of others, 
sometimes on the basis of very little information. We 
showed how incremental theorists, in contrast, tended 
to focus more on psychological mediators in under- 
standing people's behavior (people's goals, feelings, 
states of mind). We also suggested that for them, really 
knowing aperson would involve seeing him or her over 
a variety of situations and integrating the information. 
Anderson, in his commentary, suggests that perhaps 
when quick social judgments are called for, it may 
advantageous to be an entity theorist. 
This intriguing suggestion presupposes that entity 
theorists are "experts" in rapid judgment. It presup- 
poses that the initial trait judgments made by entity 
theorists are more complete and accurate than the initial 
mediational analyses made by incremental theorists. 
On the other hand, it is possible that although incremen- 
tal theorists prefer to take into account more informa- 
tion, they are able to make reasonable decisions with 
whatever evidence is available. This would be interest- 
ing to test empirically in a situation where there is a 
criterion of accuracy and where participants are given 
limited information with which to make judgments and 
predictions. We could then tell whether entity theorists 
do, in fact, have the greater ability to "size up" people 
on the basis of first impressions. Our past work suggests 
that this is most likely the case when the target person 
truly fits a stereotype or, as Anderson suggests, when 
there is no situational information that would conflict 
with a straightforward trait ascription. Our prediction 
is that entity theorists would be less accurate than 
incremental theorist when the target has characteristics 
that erroneously suggest a stereotype or when there is 
information that should modify trait attributions. 
Peterson also makes the compelling suggestion that 
the cognitive efficiency and parsimony of the entity 
theory may be greatly adaptive for such people as 
politicians, whose success is often linked to the simplic- 
ity of their message. He notes that in our society, 
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"individuals with simple, highly general, value-laden 
schemas may be better adjusted and more highly re- 
garded than other individuals." This would,be certainly 
be quite a worthwhile hypothesis to test. 
In summary, it would be interesting to determine 
when the rapid trait ascriptions made by entity theorists 
might be advantageous and when the more context-sen- 
sitive mediational analyses that characterize the incre- 
mental theorists are preferable. 
Measurement of Implicit Theories 
Several commentators had questions about our mea- 
sures of implicit theories. We have taken many steps to 
ensure the validity of our measure, particularly because 
the measure presents the entity theory choices for par- 
ticipants to agree or disagree with. First, we have gone 
to great lengths to ensure that endorsing the entity 
theory was not a function of an acquiescence set or a 
reflection of social desirability tendencies. Next, we 
have taken pains to show that those who disagree with 
the entity theory statements (that the attribute cannot be 
changed) do in fact hold an incremental theory and do 
not simply reject the entity theory. For example, on 
several occasions we asked our participants to explain 
their theory choices, and in virtually every case, those 
who disagreed with the entity theory statements explic- 
itly espoused an incremental theory-the belief that the 
attribute can be changed. 
We have also used converging operations to test the 
measure's validity. For example, we have manipulated 
participants' implicit theories to see whether we get the 
same results as we do when we measure their naturally 
existing implicit theories using our measures. What we 
find, whether we are looking at goal choices, judg- 
ments, or persistence as dependent measures, is that 
participants who are given entity or incremental theo- 
ries look much the same as participants who are classi- 
fied as holding those theories according to our measure. 
For example, in two just-completed studies by Chi-yue 
Chiu, college students did well or poorly on an ability 
test and then were asked if they were interested in 
pursuing remedial work that was likely to aid their 
future performance. In the first study, students' theories 
were assessed by means of our measure, whereas in the 
second study, students' theories were manipulated by 
means of a compelling scientific article (Bergen, 199 1). 
The same pattern of results was obtained in both stud- 
ies. Basically, incremental theorists who had done 
poorly were very eager to pursue the remedial work, 
but entity theorists who had done poorly were not. 
(Whether the entity theorists did not believe that they 
could change their ability or did not wish to risk engag- 
ing in remedial work and still doing poorly, they did not 
elect a learning task that could serve their goal of 
performing well in the future.) These kinds of studies, 
in which those given an explicit entity or incremental 
theory look very much the same as those already hold- 
ing these theories, lend further support to the validity 
of our measures. 
That said, it is also true that as scientists we are 
always seeking better ways to do what we do, and we 
have continued to experiment with different ways of 
asking our implicit theory questions. Recently, Sheri 
Levy-Wexley and Claudia Mueller, in our laboratory, 
devised a new implicit theory measure that contains 
both entity and incremental choices. For each item, a 
stem is presented (A person's intelligence is something 
about them that they . . . ; People's intelligence is an 
attribute that they . . . ; Someone's intelligence is part of 
them that they . . . ). Participants then complete the stem 
by choosing either "cannot change" or "can change." 
This measure, while offering both options to partici- 
pants, avoids the problem of presenting a too-compel- 
ling statement of the incremental theory that 
participants in some of our past studies seemed unable 
to resist. In addition, this new measure, like the one we 
have been using, has very high internal reliability (.98). 
Interestingly, the correlation between this new mea- 
sure and our old one further attests to the validity of the 
measure we have been using. In a sample of 134 par- 
ticipants who took both measures, the correlation be- 
tween the two measures was .88. Of those who were 
classified as entity theorists on the old measure, 91 3 %  
were classified as entity theorists on the new one. Even 
more important (as our old measure did not give partic- 
ipants a chance to endorse the incremental theory di- 
rectly), of those who were classified as incremental 
theorists on the old measure, 90.6% were classified in 
the same way on the new measure. Thus, when those 
who disagree with the entity theory are given the op- 
portunity to directly endorse the incremental theory, 
they do so. 
In summary, although it may initially give pause that 
the measures we have been using do not include a direct 
incremental choice, our validation studies, our manip- 
ulation studies, and the results from a new version of 
the implicit theory measure all attest to the validity of 
the measures for assessing both the entity and the 
incremental theory. 
Extensions of the Model 
Are There Other Implicit Theories or 
World Views? 
Several commentators (Peterson, Sorrentino, and 
Weiner) suggest, quite plausibly, that placing our 
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model in the context of other implicit theories or world 
views would offer a broader perspective and would 
increase the power of our approach. This is something 
that we have thought about at great length, reading 
extensively in philosophy and psychology on this and 
related subjects. However, we have not yet identified 
other implicit theories or world views that we believe 
have the psychological significance of the ones we have 
been studying. 
First, we believe that the issues of fixedness versus 
malleability are fundamental to human cognition and 
that, developmentally, these are variables that are crit- 
ical to a child's emerging understanding of the world- 
both the physical world and the social world as well as 
the self. As children come to know theirphysical world, 
they must learn which objects are relatively permanent 
and which can be acted on in ways that change them. 
More precisely, they must learn what operations 
have what effects on what objects. For example, they 
must learn that pouring water from one container to 
another does not change the amount (Piaget's classic 
conservation task), but that boiling the water for a 
period of time does. Interestingly, viewed in this way, 
Piaget's emphasis on conservation (children's coming 
to the knowledge that substances remain invariant 
across operations or transformations) is only part of the 
picture. Certain objects do indeed vary when acted on 
in particular ways. As such knowledge accrues, chil- 
dren will come to know which objects are relatively 
malleable and can be altered by many operations and 
which are relatively fixed and can be altered by few, if 
any, operations. In this way, they will be able to form 
expectations for the behavior of objects and will under- 
stand how to interact with them in effective ways. 
In a related manner, children must learn which as- 
pects of their social world are amenable to personal 
control and which are likely to remain invariant in the 
face of attempted change. Again, the issue of what is 
alterable through one's actions and what is simply a 
fixed given would seem to be a very critical one for 
effective functioning in the social world. Then, as chil- 
dren begin to develop a sense of self and its attributes, 
the same questions may be asked. That is, in the same 
way that they asked whether the objects and processes 
in their environment were subject to change through 
their efforts, they may now ask whether the attributes 
of the self are permanent givens or are malleable qual- 
ities. The answer to this question may tell them what 
goals to pursue and may guide how they seek to build 
and maintain their self-esteem (see Dweck, 1991; 
Dweck & Leggett, 1988). 
We are thus arguing that the fixed-malleable distinc- 
tion is a very basic one that people apply to all manner 
of objects, processes, and attributes. These distinctions 
will enhance the perceived predictability of their world 
and will serve as guides to behavior in that world. 
Next, when we look at writings on world views, we 
find that the ones that have been most often identified 
as shaping human thought are highly similar to the two 
implicit theories we have been investigating (although 
we conceive of our implicit theories as domain specific 
and the world views are usually conceived of as domain 
general). Typically, some type of static or fixed view is 
pitted against some type of dynamic or maileable-con- 
trollable view. For example, as we noted in the target 
article, the metaphysical systems portrayed by Alfred 
North Whitehead (1929,1938) we built entirely around 
static versus dynamic world views. Me contrasted sci- 
entific systems and philosophical theories that assume 
a world of static objects versus dynamic, evolving 
processes. Not only are these two world views consis- 
tent with our entity and incremental 'theories, but the 
properties, workings, and implications of the systems 
are similar. For example, in the static view, the empha- 
sis is on measurement of enduring properties, whereas 
in the dynamic view, the emphasis is on understanding 
and influencing the dynamic processes in the evolving 
systems. 
Toward the end of his life, Jean Piaget (Piaget & 
Garcia, 1983) came to the view that the growth of 
logical thought, heretofore the alpha and omega of 
cognitive life for him, did not provide a complete 
account of cognitive development or of individual dif- 
ferences in cognition. He came to believe that equally 
important in shaping cognition were the conceptions of 
the world to which the individual subscribed. Of these, 
he saw two primary ones: the Aristotelian view of the 
world as essentially static versus the conception of the 
world as being in aconstant state of "becoming." Piaget 
and Garcia detailed how these conceptions of the world 
can control the assimilation of every experience by 
generating different interpretive frameworks for one's 
experiences. 
Indeed, a number of modern thinkers not only iden- 
tify these two world views but regard the introduction 
of the dynamic world view as defining the onset of the 
modern era in Western science, philosophy, and soci- 
ety. For example, Agnes Heller (1967/1981), in her 
book Renaissance Man, argued that the revolution of 
the Renaissance was a revolution in the conception of 
persons. For her, what defined this pivotal period, what 
made later democratic revolutions possible, and what 
ushered in the modern age was a general shift from a 
static conception of persons toward a dynamic one. In 
the static conception that was prevalent during antiq- 
uity, people were viewed as having circumscribed po- 
tentialities and objective limits. The Renaissance 
introduced the dynamic idea of self-creation and the 
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perfectibility of the self-the idea that people can shape 
their own natures. Alexandre Koyre (1957), the histo- 
rian and philosopher of science, agreed that the sweep- 
ing revolution in thought that occurred in the 16th and 
17th centuries involved a fundamental change in world 
view away from a conception of the world as a closed, 
finite, well-ordered, static hierarchy of perfection to a 
conception of the world as an unbounded one best 
understood in terms of dynamic processes. 
Both linguists (Bloom, 198 1 ; Whorf, 1956) and phi- 
losophers (Langer, 1982) have suggested that these 
different modes of thought may describe and explain 
important cross-cultural differences. Whorf and Bloom 
argued that these different ways of thinking are embod- 
ied in language. Whorf (1956) compared standard Eu- 
ropean languages with the Hopi language, pointing out 
the ways in which the European languages made con- 
tinuous variables, such as time, into objectified, dis- 
crete units, thus laying the foundation, he believed, for 
the more static metaphysics of the European cultures. 
In a related vein, Bloom proposed that some languages, 
like English, tend to "entify" the attributes of people 
and things, for example, by taking adjectives that de- 
scribe people's behavior (e.g., intelligent, honest) and 
making them into nouns that imply a more static inter- 
nal property with its own reality (intelligence, honesty). 
Thus, a host of thinkers have identified static versus 
dynamic world views as fundamental modes of human 
cognition. 
Petersen, in his commentary, cites Pepper's (1942) 
well-known book, World Hypotheses, and wonders 
how our theories fit with the several world views that 
Pepper described. Although Petersen enumerates six 
such views, Pepper boiled down the meaningful world 
theories of philosophers into four basic ones: formism, 
mechanism, contextualism, and organicism. However, 
Pepper went on to note that there is "a very strong 
tendency for formism and mechanism to combine. 
They fly to each other's arms for mutual support" (p. 
146). He then asserted that "contextualism and organi- 
cism are so nearly allied that they may almost be called 
the same theory" (p. 147). (He also noted some have 
combined mechanism and contextualism, but with un- 
happy results.) This would boil it down to two basic 
theories, and when it does we find that the first is 
characterized by the existence of generalized static 
forms with discrete laws expressing the relation among 
these static constituent objects and events. The second 
is characterized by an emphasis on change and process 
occurring within contexts (like person-environment 
interactions). Thus we are left, once again, with a more 
static system of fixed elements with simpler cause-and- 
effect laws versus a more dynamic system character- 
ized by change, context, and process. 
Research by Johnson, Germer, Efran, and Overton 
(1988) supports our analysis of Pepper's world views. 
In one study, they asked researchers from different 
disciplines to fill out the World Hypothesis Scale (Har- 
ris, Fontana, & Dowds, 1977), which assesses people's 
belief in each of Pepper's four world views. A factor 
analysis was performed on the responses, and the first 
factor that came out suggested that the four world views 
are highly interrelated and that a simpler structure may 
underlie them. Specifically, the factor loadings of the 
World Hypothesis Scale on Factor 1 were -.78 (Form- 
ism), -.79 (Mechanism), .67 (Organicism), and .83 
(Contextualism). 
This finding suggests that underlying the four differ- 
ent world views may be a more central, bipolar belief 
that differentiates formism and mechanism from or- 
ganicism and contextualism. (Johnson et al., them- 
selves favor a two-world-view system-mechanism 
and organicism.) 
To summarize, we remain open to the possibility of 
identifying other psychologically meaningful world 
views, but we have not yet discovered ones that are (a) 
clearly different from the ones we have studied, and (b) 
likely to have the same level of cognitive and motiva- 
tional impact. 
However, there is another type of variable that we 
think is important to consider, and we have included 
an assessment of it in virtually all of our studies of 
implicit theories. It is a confidence, optimism, or 
positivity dimension, and it could be considered to 
represent a kind of world view (see, e.g., Janoff-Bul- 
man, 1992). Specifically, in our studies of students' 
theories about their intelligence, we ask participants 
to rate their confidence in their own intelligence. In 
our studies of implicit theories of people's morality, 
we ask participants to rate their confidence in 
people's moral character. (See Table 4 in the target 
article for examples of the items on these measures 
and Table 5 for the correlations between measures of 
implicit theories and confidence. Contrary to 
Darley's intuition that entity theorists would be more 
negative or pessimistic th~an incremental theorists, 
there is no consistent relation between implicit theo- 
ries and confidence or optimism in any of the do- 
mains we have studied.) When we measure both 
implicit theories and confidence, we typically find 
that implicit theories account for a great deal more 
of the variance. However, as suggested by Har- 
ackiewicz and Elliot and by Schunk, the confidence 
variable can combine with implicit theories in inter- 
esting ways. For example, entity theorists with high 
confidence in their intelligence are sometimes more 
mastery oriented on some dependent measures than 
are their counterparts with low confidence. Thus, 
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high confidence can sometimes serve as a protective 
factor (see Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, in press; see also 
Elliott & Dweck, 1988). 
In summary, in our studies of achievement motiva- 
tion and of social judgment, we have focused on the 
role of entity versus incremental implicit theories, but 
we continually seek to identify other variables that play 
a role in the processes we are studying. 
Stereotyping and Beliefs About Group 
Differences 
Several of the commentators asked about the relation 
between implicit theories and stereotyping or suggested 
that research in each area could potentially inform the 
other-for example, about how person-related knowl- 
edge structures influence judgments, affect, and behav- 
ior (see the Anderson, Darley, and Kruglanski 
commentaries). We have given a great deal of thought 
to how implicit theories might be related to stereotyp- 
ing. For example, given our findings that entity theo- 
rists tend to readily assign fixed traits to people, we 
wondered whether they would also apply traits more 
readily to groups of people and thus engage in stereo- 
typing more than incremental theorists. Incremental 
theorists, for their parts, are more likely to look at the 
psychological processes and circumstances behind be- 
havior (Hong, 1994) and to take account of the circum- 
stances of the individual (Erdley & Dweck, 1993). 
They might thus be less likely to form trait-based 
stereotypes. 
We have initiated a line of research to address this 
question. In one set of studies (by Sheri Levy-Wexley 
and Carol Dweck), we are looking at entity and incre- 
mental theorists' knowledge of racial stereotypes, their 
endorsement of racial stereotypes, and their explana- 
tions for those stereotypes. In another set of studies (by 
Steve Stroessner, Sheri Levy-Wexley, and Dweck et 
al.), we are giving participants information about the 
behavior of people in novel groups. One group is char- 
acterized by many positive moral acts (or intelligent 
acts) and the other by many negative (or unintelligent) 
ones. The question here is whether entity theorists are 
more likely than incremental theorists to form stereo- 
types of the novel groups. For example, are they more 
likely than incremental theorists to ascribe traits to the 
groups such that they (a) exaggerate the differences 
between the groups, (b) underestimate the differences 
within the groups, and (c) generalize the traits to new 
members of the groups? 
We had not completed any of these studies when we 
wrote the target article, but we have now completed the 
first set, and the results are quite interesting. We found, 
first, that when we asked college students to list the 
common stereotypes of African Americans, entity and 
incremental theorists (implicit person theory) were ex- 
tremely similar in the number and type of stereotypes 
they listed as well as in the valence they attached to each 
stereotype. Thus, any differences between entity and 
incremental theorists are not ascribable to differences 
in exposure to or knowledge of stereotypes. (See Dev- 
ine, 1989, and Gilbert & Hixon, 1991, for discussions 
of how individuals may not differ in their knowledge 
about stereotypes or the availability of stereotypical 
beliefs, but rather in the their degree of agreement with 
those beliefs and in the probability that they will apply 
them in relevant situations.) 
Indeed, it was when the groups were asked to rate 
how true they thought the stereotypes were that dif- 
ferences began to emerge. In two studies, one in 
which participants rated the stereotypes that they had 
generated and one in which they rated a series of 
stereotyped attributes that we provided, entity theo- 
rists rated the stereotypes overall as significantly 
more true than did incremental theorists. Moreover, 
they rated several individual stereotypes as more 
true, including ones that referred to moral character 
and intellectual ability. 
Our participants were also asked to explain why 
they thought particular stereotypes of African 
Americans had persisted. To indicate their beliefs, 
they rated several possible explanations for each of 
the stereotypes we presented. Of greatest interest to 
us were explanations that invoked innate character- 
istics of the group versus explanations that invoked 
the experience or environment of the group. As one 
might predict from their belief in fixed traits, entity 
theorists explained the stereotypes more in terms of 
innate characteristics than did incremental theorists. 
In contrast, also in line with our prediction, incre- 
mental theorists agreed more with environmental 
explanations than did entity theorists. 
We wondered whether the relative tendencies of 
entity and incremental theorists to invoke innate factors 
were specific to their explanations of stereotyped attri- 
butes or were simply the ways in which the groups 
tended to understand the origins of attributes in general. 
Therefore, in another study, entity and incremental 
theorists were given essentially the same series of attri- 
butes (not attached to any social group) and the same 
array of explanations to rate. As before, entity theorists 
endorsed innate explanations for these attributes signif- 
icantly more strongly than did incremental theorists, 
whereas incremental theorists endorsed environmental 
explanations significantly more strongly than the entity 
theorists. This suggests that the greater tendency of 
entity theorists to characterize social groups in terms of 
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innate traits of character and ability is a natural out- 
growth of the way they understand people and their 
attributes in general. In the same vein, it suggests that 
the greater tendency of incremental theorists to empha- 
size environmental factors as influences on group attri- 
butes is a natural extension of the way in which they 
understand the development of personal attributes in 
general. 
In summary, our research is showing that entity 
theorists, more than incremental theorists, believe that 
stereotypes of African Americans are true and that 
these stereotyped traits are a result of innate factors. 
Darley, in his commentary, refers to the arguments 
made in The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) 
that intelligence is in large part genetically based and 
fixed and that, therefore, differences in the intellectual 
performance of different racial groups is an unalterable 
fact. He points out that entity theorists may be well on 
their way to holding such a point of view. Our research 
findings just cited show that entity theorists do indeed 
hold views that are like some of the views expressed in 
The Bell Curve. The findings also suggest the hypoth- 
esis that, like Herrnstein and Murray, entity theorists 
might also be less likely to see merit in social programs 
designed to help disadvantaged minorities "catch up" 
with the more advantaged groups. That is, if someone 
believes that a trait is innate and unalterable, then what 
would be the purpose of spending large sums of money 
trying to change that very trait? We are in the process 
of testing this hypothesis. 
The idea that group stereotyping may be a natural 
outgrowth of a very common way of thinking has many 
implications. It may explain why stereotyping and its 
offshoot, prejudice, are so ubiquitous and why attempts 
to counter stereotyping and prejudice so often meet 
with such limited success. Although stereotyping and 
prejudice may serve a variety of goals (self-esteem 
goals, need for a scapegoat), om work suggests that 
individuals may not even need these special goals to 
display these tendencies. (In this regard, our view 
would resemble other cognitive theories of stereotyp- 
ing, such as Hamilton, Stroessner, & Driscoll, 1994). 
Instead, our findings suggest that these tendencies may 
arise rather spontaneously, because they are so clearly 
related to how entity theorists tend to understand and 
react to the social world. 
According to our analysis, how would one address 
stereotyping and prejudice? Our analysis implies that if 
one wished to address stereotyping, one might well 
have to address individuals' implicit person theory, 
perhaps challenging some of their assumptions about 
the nature of human attributes and, in an allied waygr, 
their assumptions about how best to understand people 
and their behavior. 
Implicit Theories and Cross-Cmltnra8 
Differences 
Several of the commentators (Anderson, Kruglanski, 
and Peterson) ask whether implicit theories might help 
account for cross-cultural differences, and we believe 
that they may well. First, Stevenson and Stigler (1992), 
in their influential book The Learning Gap: Why Our 
Schools Are Failing and What We Can Learn From 
Japanese and Chinese Edasation, reported their ex- 
tensive cross-cultural research comparing the 
achievement beliefs of Asian school children and 
their parents with those of American school children 
and their parents (see also Stevenson B Lee, 1990). 
Their results show a far greater belief in malleable 
intelligence and in the importance of effort among 
those in the Asian culture, compared to the relatively 
greater emphasis in our culture on fixed intelligence 
and the role of ability (vs. effort) in influencing 
achievement. The authors speculated that the differ- 
ence in these beliefs may help account for the greater 
achievement that characterizes students from Asian 
cultures. 
On another front, Markus and Kitayama (1991) com- 
pare cultures that emphasize an interdependent versus 
independent self. (See also Triandis, 1989, for a discus- 
sion of collectivistic vs. individualistic cultures, a 
highly related dimension.) Markus and Kitayama hy- 
pothesized that people in interdependent (Eastern) cul- 
tures, because of their view of persons as embedded in 
contexts, would be less likely to explain people's be- 
havior in terns of (context-free) personality traits than 
would people in the American culture, who view per- 
sons as more decontextualized beings. They then re- 
view evidence that individuals in Eastern cultures do, 
in fact, produce fewer personality traits and more con- 
text-situated descriptions in describing people and ex- 
plaining their behavior than do their American 
counteparts (e.g., Miller, 1984; Shweder & Bourne, 
1984). 
Bn a recent article, Morris and Peng (1994) presented 
additional evidence that Chinese subjects generate 
fewer traits as causal explanations than do Americans. 
However, they propose that the lesser tendency of 
Asians to make trait causal attributions may stem, not 
simply from greater collectivism or interdependence 
per se, but from a greater prevalence of incrementd- 
type theories in their cultures. Given our consistent 
finding of the association between implicit theories and 
trait use, it seemed possible to us as well that implicit 
theories could help account for the cultural difference, 
especially given Stevenson and Stigler's finding of 
greater incremental beliefs about intelligence in Asian 
cultures. 
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We are now testing this hypothesis by assessing 
implicit theories, individualistic versus collectivistic 
beliefs (as measured by the Brown et al., 1992, scale), 
and trait ascription in Hong Kong and American sam- 
ples. As of this time, we have only half of the data-the 
Hong Kong half-but these data are already interest- 
ing. First, when we compare the endorsement of the 
implicit theories in the Hong Kong sample to the en- 
dorsement level we have typically found in our compa- 
rable American samples, it is clear that the proportion 
of incremental theorists is appreciably greater in the 
Hong Kong sample (as predicted by Anderson in his 
commentary). Second, when we look at the relation 
between the belief measures and trait ascription in the 
Hong Kong sample, we find a significant negative 
relation between the tendency to hold an incremental 
theory and the tendency toward trait ascription. This 
relation was, in fact, stronger than the relation between 
individualism-collectivism and trait ascription, and it 
remained highly significant when the effect of collec- 
tivism was partialled out. 
In short, our look into implicit theories as a factor in 
cross-cultural differences has just begun, but we are 
encouraged by the promising tidbits that have presented 
themselves thus far. 
Origins and Development of Implicit 
Theories 
Several commentators (Anderson, Lewis, Peterson, 
and Schunk) ask how individuals come to form partic- 
ular implicit theories. Our work with young children is 
beginning to suggest some ways. Although we do not 
rule out children's temperament as a factor that can set 
them along a path to one theory or the other (as sug- 
gested by Lewis), we are beginning to understand the 
socialization practices that might play a key role. (It 
should also be noted that the studies in which we 
manipulated implicit theories speak to the potential for 
the environment to influence them.) 
Our first hints about the rearing practices that might 
foster the different theories came from studies with 
young children in which we asked our preschool and 
kindergarten participants to role-play parental reac- 
tions to their failures or mistakes (see Dweck, 1991; 
Heyman, Dweck, & Cain, 1992). In these studies, we 
saw dramatic differences in the adult-child scenarios 
role-played by children who displayed helpless re- 
sponses and a belief in stable goodness-badness versus 
those who displayed more mastery-oriented responses 
and a belief that badness could be changed. Specific- 
ally, the helplesslfixed-theory children role-played sig- 
nificantly more criticism and punishment from the 
adult figures, often having the adult tell them that they 
were bad for what they had done. In contrast, the 
mastery-orientedlmalleable-theory children role- 
played significantly more positive and constructive 
responses from the adults in their lives. Not only did 
they have the adults complimenting the positive aspects 
of their work, but they also had them suggesting future 
strategies, like more effort, that might be useful. 
Although we did not take the role-played scenarios 
literally-for we doubt that many parents are so critical 
or punitive of a young child's performance-they did 
lead us to form hypotheses about what kinds of social- 
ization regimes might foster the different beliefs and 
response patterns displayed by the children. 
In a new study by Melissa Kamins and Carol Dweck, 
we tested these hypotheses. Using dolls and imaginary 
scenarios (based on ones used by Heyman et al., 1992), 
we had children pretend to perform a series of four tasks 
for a teacher. (We used dolls and imaginary scenarios 
so that no criticism would be delivered to the children 
themselves.) In each case, the performance of the task 
was inadequate or incomplete, and the teacher, after 
pointing out the inadequacy, delivered one of four kinds 
of critical feedback (with children randomly assigned 
to condition). This ranged from feedback that reflected 
on the child as a person and that conveyed contingent 
regard from the adult ("I'm very disappointed in you") 
to feedback that oriented children toward future strate- 
gies ("'Maybe you could think of another way to do it.") 
The other two feedback conditions focused on the act 
itself ("That's not the right way to do it" and "That's 
not the right way to do it because . . ."). Children were 
then given a fifth scenario of the same general format 
except that they now received no feedback about their 
mistake. The question was, how would they respond to 
this last scenario as afunction of the prior feedback they 
had received? 
We found that the feedback significantly affected the 
way children judged themselves, the affect they re- 
ported, how constructively they responded to the final 
scenario, and even their implicit theory of goodness- 
badness. The children who received the person judg- 
ment (compared to the other three groups taken 
together and compared to the group that received the 
strategy feedback) showed significantly harsher self- 
judgments for the last scenario (saying they felt that 
they were not good or nice children), rated themselves 
as significantly sadder, came up with significantly 
fewer constructive solutions for addressing their mis- 
take, and agreed significantly more with a fixed theory 
of goodness-badness. The strategy group, in contrast, 
showed the most positive and constructive responses 
overall, along with endorsement of malleable good- 
ness-badness. 
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How might the feedback have influenced the 
children's implicit theories? Feedback that conveys 
judgment of the child as person may suggest that the 
adult, by scrutinizing the child's behavior or perfor- 
mance, has seen deeply into the child and has rendered 
a judgment of a permanent quality (e.g., the child's 
basic goodness, adequacy, or worth). Feedback that 
suggests new strategies, in contrast, suggests that defi- 
ciencies can be altered through effort. 
In summary, the results of this study suggest that a 
judgmental stance on the part of parents may foster the 
development of fixed theories in children, along with a 
tendency toward harsher self-judgments and more 
helpless responses. An emphasis on effort and strate- 
gies, by comparison, can foster the development of 
malleable theories, along with a more positive, mas- 
tery-oriented response to obstacles. Admittedly, we 
were a bit surprised at how readily these theories and 
response patterns could be fostered and, thus, how 
readily children's histories and established patterns 
could be overridden. However, the results were ex- 
tremely clear and strong, with the predicted differences 
occurring on almost every measure. This lends further 
support to the notion that the implicit theories are very 
basic categories of cognition that children may be "pre- 
pared" to learn and apply. It also lends support to the 
idea that implicit theories may be knowledge structures 
that we have available to us and that become differen- 
tially accessible depending on the situation. 
We have also wondered whether an entity theory 
might be fostered by parents who overpraise positive 
traits-for example, always telling children how smart 
they are when they do something well. Might this also 
instill in the child the sense that his or her products 
reflect some deep and permanent quality? Might this 
also set children up to be vulnerable when a flawed 
product is produced, if they now take this as a new 
reading of their inner attribute? Again, an entity theory 
is the theory that an attribute is fixed (not alterable 
through one's actions), but one never knows at what 
level the attribute is fixed. In a current study (by Clau- 
dia Mueller, Melissa Kamins, and Carol Dweck), we 
are testing hypotheses about the effects of different 
types of praise on young children's beliefs, self-judg- 
ments, affect, and behavior in the face of subsequent 
setbacks. 
In another project in our laboratory, Claudia 
Mueller and Carol Dweck are looking directly at 
parental reports of their beliefs and practices and 
testing our hypotheses about how these predict their 
children's beliefs and response patterns. In short, we 
are very interested in the origins of implicit theories 
and in the factors that influence their development 
and expression. 
Concluding Comments 
In summary, we have considered a number of issues 
relating to our model and its constructs: where motiva- 
tion fits into the model, whether people can hold both 
implicit theories, the causal relations among the vari- 
ables in the model, when an entity theory might be 
advantageous, the benefits of thinking of implicit the- 
ories as knowledge structures, and how implicit theo- 
ries are best measured. We also examined 
generalizations of the model to new areas, such as 
stereotyping and cross-cultural differences. Finally, we 
considered the origins of implicit theories and pre- 
sented new research findings that speak to this question. 
Commentators also wondered about the relations 
between implicit theories and other cognitive, person- 
ality, and motivational variables and saw potentially 
rich links to other research traditions. These are issues 
that we are continuing to think about and investigate 
empirically. We expect that the many perceptive com- 
ments will continue to inform our research for a long 
time to come. 
Notes 
Chi-yue Chiu is now at the University of Hong Kong, 
and Ying-yi Hong is now at the Hong Kong Institute of 
Science and Technology. 
Carol S. Dweck, Department of Psychology, 
Schermerhorn Hall, Columbia University, New York, 
NY 10027. 
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